Introduction 3 * * * The central problem with assessing probability in national security is that the most important judgments also tend to be the most subjective. What is the likelihood of suffering a major terrorist attack in the near future? How certain should intelligence officials have been that Saddam Hussein was pursuing weapons of mass destruction? How do we estimate the chances that a military operation will succeed? What is the probability that the United States and China will go to war within the next two decades or that North Korea will use its nuclear arsenal to harm another country? Though these kinds of questions play major roles in shaping national security policy, they almost never yield clear, "right" answers.
Though some people see probability assessment as an arcane topic, this is only because they do not approach the matter as explicitly as President Obama did when discussing the Abbottabad raid.
It is essentially impossible to have an opinion about national security policy without engaging in some kind of probabilistic reasoning. Logically speaking, you cannot justify a costly action without believing that its chances of success are high enough to make expected benefits exceed expected costs. The question is thus not whether to assess probability when debating national security issues, Introduction 4 chance of success." While Gray meant to use the phrase "fair chance" in the same way that a letter grade of C reflects "fair performance," President Kennedy interpreted "fair" as though it meant "fine," thereby assuming that the Joint Chiefs supported the plan. After the invasion collapsed, Gray believed that his vague language had enabled a major strategic blunder, while Kennedy resented the Joint Chiefs for not giving him better warning.
3 Similar aversion to probabilistic reasoning is both common and deliberate in many areas of national security decision making. Chapter 1, for example, will show how U.S. military doctrine encourages commanders to identify courses of action that minimize risk and that offer the highest chances of success, but not necessarily to identify what those risks and chances are. Many intelligence agencies in the United States and other countries instruct analysts to leave probability assessments intentionally vague. From 2003 to 2011, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security assessed the risk of terrorism with an idiosyncratic, color-coded spectrum that may have done more to raise citizens' levels of stress than their levels of preparation. 4 Many scholars and pundits are Introduction 5 just as reluctant to describe the uncertainty surrounding their judgments when debating national security in the public sphere. Phrases like "a fair chance of success" would quite often be more precise than the arguments that policy advocates use to justify placing lives and resources at risk.
5
As a practical matter, debates about proper methods for assessing probability shape the way that intelligence analysts report any key judgment, the way that military planners present any course of action, the way that decision makers discuss any high-stakes issue, and the way that scholars and pundits debate the merits of any national security policy. Yet this book is not a technical manual for policy analysis. Rather, the following chapters use pragmatic debates about probability assessment as a window into deeper concerns about the nature and limits of subjective judgment in national security decision making. How is it possible to draw coherent conclusions -let alone precise judgments -about something as complicated as the probability that a military operation will succeed? If these judgments are inherently subjective, then how can they be useful? To what extent can real people handle this challenge, particularly given the psychological and political Homeland Security Advisory System," International Security, Vol. 32, No. 2 (Fall 2007) , pp.
121-154.
5 For critiques of the coarse manner in which public debates treat uncertainty regarding national Introduction 6 constraints that surround high-stakes decisions? These are not just policy questions: they are social science questions, and they are the focus of this book.
The book's main goal is to clarify the probabilistic foundations of national security policy, and I mean this in two, related ways. First, the book demonstrates that placing greater emphasis on probability assessment would bring wide-ranging improvements to national security discourse, both within government and throughout the broader public sphere. Second, the book attempts to resolve long-standing confusion about the logic, psychology, and politics of assessing uncertainty in international affairs. A second skeptical view of probability assessment in national security, which I call rejectionism, holds that attempts to analyze the probabilistic foundations of national security policy are not just misguided, but actively counterproductive. Chapter 4, for example, describes how many scholars and practitioners worry that assessing probabilities can surround subjective judgments with illusions of rigor, giving the impression that analysts' views are more scientific Introduction 9 than they really are. Chapter 5 then examines common claims about how making clear assessments of uncertainty exposes national security analysts to excessive criticism, thereby undermining their credibility and creating incentives for analysts to warp their judgments. These arguments lead many observers to oppose the idea of debating uncertainty in the way that President Obama and his advisers discussed the chances that Osama bin Laden was living in Abbottabad. The U.S.
Defense Intelligence Agency's official analytic standards thus currently state that "DIA does not condone the use of probability percentages in its products to portray likelihood." 12 The sentence is italicized in the original document, but the use of the verb "condone" by itself conveys the scorn -even moral opprobrium -that a major intelligence agency directs towards the notion that its analysts should concern themselves with making clear probability assessments. If vagueness and confusion are the best that we can hope for when assessing probability, then that is important to know. But this is a claim that deserved to be tested, and not simply accepted at face value.
Throughout this book, we will see how even though skeptical views of probability assessment are widespread in security studies, there is relatively little existing research that submits these skeptical claims to rigorous scrutiny. 19 Most existing scholarship on probability assessment in challenge. In this sense, the book offers a fundamentally optimistic message: the reason to be concerned with existing approaches to probability assessment is not just because they indicate vagueness or confusion in their own right, but because it is genuinely possible to do better.
Chapter outline
Chapter 1 sets the stage for this discussion by describing how scholars, practitioners, and pundits often debate probability assessments in a manner that is too vague to support sound decision making. The issue here is not just that national security analysts tend to express probability imprecisely but that, in many cases, they hardly grapple with the important probabilities at all, particularly by analyzing which policies offer the best prospects of success or by debating whether actions are necessary to achieve their objectives, without directly assessing the chances that highstakes decisions will actually work. Chapter 2 explores the theoretical foundations of probability assessment, explaining why national security analysts always possess a firm theoretical basis for estimating subjective probabilities in clear and structured ways. Chapter 3 then demonstrates that real people can implement these ideas. By analyzing a database containing nearly one million geopolitical forecasts, Chapter 3 shows that national security analysts can reliably parse their probability assessments with numeric precision, even when dealing with unique, subjective issues.
Together, Chapters 1-3 show that the theoretical and empirical foundations for assessing probability in national security affairs are stronger than what the conventional wisdom allows.
Next, the book considers the argument that even if national security analysts could make their probability assessments more meaningful in principle, doing so would have unacceptable consequences in practice. Chapter 4 explores the psychology of probability assessment, presenting Introduction 15 a series of experiments involving more than six hundred national security professionals. These experiments show that small differences in probability assessments consistently shape the way that national security officials evaluate high-stakes decisions, 21 while refuting common concerns about how this kind of analysis creates misleading illusions of rigor. Chapter 5 then examines the politics of probability assessment, combining historical analyses of perceived intelligence failures with a nationally-representative survey of public opinion to demonstrate that vague assessments of uncertainty may actually expose national security analysts to more criticism than they prevent.
These chapters suggest that the rejectionists' view of subjective probability rests on a series of misconceptions: for example, conflating the fact that probability assessment is uncomfortable with the idea that it is harmful, or assuming that if criticism directed towards national security analysts can be unfair, then this criticism must also distort those analysts' incentives. In showing that these arguments are both conceptually and empirically unsound, these chapters push back against longstanding cynicism about the nature and limits of probability assessment in national security.
Introduction 16
The book's last two chapters provide a closer analysis of what it takes to make probability assessments useful for decision making. Chapter 6 shows how decision makers can use subjective probability assessments to structure difficult choices, even when they face additional uncertainty about how to estimate the costs and benefits that national security decisions entail. This kind of reasoning is especially important in situations where leaders cannot observe strategic progress directly, which is one of the main difficulties in evaluating military operations, economic sanctions, and other national security policies that play out over extended periods of time. In this context, I explain why clear probabilistic reasoning is not only helpful, but also logically necessary in order to understand when decision makers would be better off changing course as opposed to doubling down on their existing strategies. Chapter 7 concludes by exploring practical opportunities for improving the quality of probabilistic reasoning in national security debates. The chapter explains, in particular, how multiple advocacy can play an important role in pressing proponents of major decisions to justify the probabilistic foundations of their arguments. In this respect, the goal of improving probability assessment in national security decision making is not just an issue for government officials, but that it is also a matter of how scholars, journalists, and pundits can raise the standards of public discourse.
Methods and approach
If presidents are "always dealing with probabilities," then how can there be so much confusion about how to handle this subject? And if the topic is so important, then why have other scholars not written a book like this one already?
One potential answer to these questions is that studying the probabilistic foundations of national security requires combining disciplinary approaches that scholars tend to pursue separately.
Understanding what subjective probability assessments mean and how they can be used to structure national security decisions (Chapters 2 and 6) requires adapting general principles from decision theory to the specific problems of security studies, and revising theoretical frameworks that international relations scholars normally use to model rational choice. Understanding the extent to which real people can employ these concepts in practice (Chapter 3 and 4) requires studying the psychological dimensions of national security analysis and decision making.
Understanding how the prospect of criticism shapes national security analysts' incentives (Chapter 5) requires merging insights from political science and organizational management. In this sense, no one academic discipline is well-suited to addressing the full range of claims that skeptics direct towards probability assessment in national security.
There are good reasons why scholars tend to specialize in these disciplines, and the book's eclectic approach involves an inevitable tradeoff of depth for breadth. Yet it is important to address these topics together and not in isolation. As the previous section explained, part of the challenge in making probability assessments meaningful is that well-intentioned efforts to mitigate one set of problems could plausibly backfire by amplifying others. Addressing these concerns requires taking a comprehensive view of the logic, psychology, and politics of probabilistic reasoning. To my knowledge, this book is the first attempt to do so.
A second reason why scholars and practitioners lack consensus on how to deal with subjective probability is that this topic is notoriously difficult to study empirically. Probability is an abstract concept that no one can observe directly. Since analysts and decision makers tend to be vague when discussing probability, it is usually hard to say what their probability assessments actually Introduction 18 mean. And even when analysts make those assessments explicit, they can still be difficult to evaluate. For instance, if you say that an event has a thirty percent chance of taking place and then it happens, how can we tell the difference between getting it wrong and being unlucky? We will see in Chapters 3 through 5 how addressing empirical controversies about the nature and limits of probabilistic reasoning requires gathering large volumes of well-structured data. Most areas of national security do not lend themselves to this kind of data collection. Scholars have thus tended to treat skepticism of probability assessment in national security as a philosophical matter, bettersuited to epistemological debates than to empirical analysis.
In recent years, however, social scientists have developed new methods to study probabilistic reasoning, and national security organizations have become increasingly receptive to supporting empirical research on this subject. Chapter 3's analysis of the value of precision in probability assessment would not have been possible without the U.S. Intelligence Community's decision to sponsor the collection of nearly one million geopolitical forecasts. This unprecedented effort has given scholars insight into the nature and limits of probability assessment in ways that were all but unthinkable a decade ago. Similarly, Chapter 4's analysis of how national security decision makers respond to probability assessments depended on the support of the National War College, sponsorship from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, and the willingness of more than six hundred national security professionals to participate in experimental research. Thus even if none of the following chapters represents the final word on its subject, one of the book's main
contributions is simply to demonstrate that it is possible to conduct rigorous empirical analysis of issues that many scholars and practitioners have previously considered intractable.
Another way in which this book departs from existing scholarship is that its motivations lie primarily in addressing normative questions about what probability assessments mean and how to Introduction 24 seventy percent probability of guilt lay beyond a reasonable doubt. 28 These seemingly arbitrary interpretations of probability raise troubling concerns about the application of criminal justice. But as in the domain of national security, many legal scholars and practitioners question the value of addressing this subject more directly.
Empirical findings from one domain do not always translate neatly into others. Yet this book's conceptual framework and empirical methodology can be extended to nearly any other discipline that involves decision making under uncertainty. And to the extent that national security analysis is typically understood to be particularly complex and subjective, this should represent a high degree of difficulty for improving the quality and rigor of probabilistic reasoning. This is another sense in which the book presents an optimistic message. To the extent that the following chapters push back against long-entrenched skepticism about the nature and limits of probability assessment in national security, this suggests that other disciplines might also benefit from revisiting their own conventional wisdom on this subject. 
